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• 
September 2 , , 197 3 
fil'J\'IJ:,H-:N'I' OF' SENi\'I'OR l\UKE t-1i\N.SFlF.LD (0 ., t-10NT . ) 
lt 1s t1me for i\merica Lo replnc~ n pol1cy of foreign landbased 
nJl111ry omuprcsancc •..;ith a po11c\ of disc-•rning internationalism . 
'l'hc dJOc n hn nl T h:·lVe off~ red w i l 1 s L 1 11111 I, 11 e Lhn l. process . Its 
p1oV1.;ionn .~n~ not c-omplex . In bncr it wtll 
(1) I"<'C{IIit·c a reduc:tion by 50X of llH• lantlbascd military 
pcr .• onncl sL1l ioned on foreign :-;oJ 1 ovvr n three-year period; 
(2) provide that at least 25% of: thf" total be accomplished in 
ca ·h oi 1 he• l ll t·ce years; 
(3) Jh:nnlL Lh.; Executive hr<lnch to al discretion to determ1nc 
fr01n ~,o,.lnch co .nt ries thQSC reduct~ons \-.tll be made . 
Tlw .imcndntC'nl simply reco<Jni.ze~ that .tpproximately 500,000 
miltt.uy P•'rsonncl ar.e presently sto~ltonc•d on foreign soil and seeks 
lO rc·cllt<'l' 1111s fiyurc Lo approximC\Lllly ~SO,Ol)O by June 30 , 1976. 
1'1H: lllllll iHhnc'nl would not affec:L Ol n•dl tcc· tho acld.i.t.ional 100,000 
1111 1 1 l.tJ'Y p(' rr-;on ne l a f loa L off f.o rc iqn sl1o res . Thus , under the to rms 
of til<" ctmr ndmL!nt. approximately B:> , nno mJ llLar.y personnel musL b12 
rctunf'{l o th0 UnJ.ted Stales by ,June· 30 , 1974 . The President. 
\ovOull have to u.l discrctton from .... htch countries these 85 , 000 
co 1l 1 he r< 1 tovNl (i.e. , Ok ina\va and Tha 1.1 <1 nd could account. for 
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1.1 ir.c p·,,l))O J( the Presldcnl ~ho:-;e ,,> rl!lurn these t:rovps 
hc"'mo). Only ron"i ,t shore hosed milltnt·y }P t:sonnel would be 
lt lu l0d 1n Lhe amputation for· elJ ~ lllit.y xor reduction . 
J\11d l.1<~ ly, Lie amC'ndmnnt rcmalnf.i ne1 rul on the question of 
d ·rtobllizatJon of the personnel returnt•d. It ~s my bel~ef that the 
~H• ~wuces to m.dnt .. in a st.:andinq 1\rmy 1n pt•acr•Lime thcough volunteers 
\-.111 !"Jgnifi<.·ont ly shrink Lhe overall ~azc· .>[ tile military force 
In la:-; respect.: thl.s nmendmcnl , .. ould complement that 
1 o c0c.:1st <1nd comp lcmcn L as w~ ll the tnan1mous uction hy the Senate 
Atmttl Services C)nunittee which recomtnf!nds an overall force level 
,-.. duel ion of 1~"">(,,000 by June 30 , 197·1. 
rhe cnaclmcnl of this amendment t,·ould be totally consistent 
wll h the N1xon noctdnc of \..:orlrlwido pt·csence manifested by other 
than lctnd forces on 1orcign soil. 
1\ction l>y tlw Congress is long overdue. •rhe Unl ted Stati.;!S 
has slatione'!d ovcrseus mon~ than SOU , OOO military personnel. 11\ 
adlil1on ... molher 100,000 of military pnrsorncl are afloat away ft·om 
our shores. 'J'Ims «pproximat:cly 30% of our military force is statione 
beyond our home land. Not since the Clctys of the Bd tJ.sh Empl.re--
or probably 111or.c truly, the Roman Empire--IJave so m«ny been r<=qUJred 
to "maintain the peace" a\vay from out: sho~- •s. Nany of our Post 
wor-ld war II mJ.litary postures and weapons procurements, and those 
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of the sov1~t Un1on as well, have been Lffilldt~vc or m1rrored respon~~; 
to '-a ·h othC'lr . W:11en one superpower dcvC'lop [l m1.ss1le the other 
rc•spond 1 n k 1 nd. 
l t only t IMt pol1cy of mirrored act ion \·•Cll! nppl1.ed to the 
sl<1L1oninq 01 u.~-; . forces on forc]gn so.i 1. 
Pl1o Sov i c•L Union has station'":d outs l<lL· Lllc Soviet Union 
appio:om,\Lc•ly 1tl!:i , OOO military pct·:.onrwl; nl this l:olnl 330,000 are 
stu.LHJIIPd 111 l·:asl•'rn Europe . It is pr<>Slllllt'l that many of these 
Sov i 1.. t uul i In ry forces in Eastern guropc a 1 e therE.' for other than an 
cxlC!rn.ll th cat from the West . i3ut nolWILh-tttnding the comparatively 
n ."'S lt t • 1 vc nnl1 t a ry overseas po ltcy of 11 • L ov1ec Union, the 
U1n u•d St..tLC'"i 1s hadly overextended ahrotl<.L ~rcscncc on fore1.ar1 
.§_Ql 1 of_so man_y_y_.~lllP itarv presumes a no I icy thal heav1.ly favors 
llh' Jll.lllt..{\ry_!.pt ion. In fact it is my Hclll•f th«L the comnutment 
_illld i<•v.•l ot ll.:~~ . force~ ab!:9a~:!...J.!_a~!.__cl(:J_CtJnitllJcl ou1· poLicy rather 
Jj1cw clltr:__pol i('y~le.!:_crminin_2_ Lh~:___!_t:_~~. s._ron:cs abroad . 
1l is olmo:;t beyond belief lo most Amet icans that our country 
mc1inulinl=: over :~,000 bases and installnL.lonG on [oreign soil; that 
thf• OC'fens<"' D~.:par tmcnL employs di rcctly or 1nd1rcctly approximately 
173,000 forC'iqn naLionals at these bases and the installations to 
supporl thc>se u.s . Forces abroad; ·hat over 314 , 000 dcpendencs are 
sLal1on~d ovnrPcas with these military forces . Disbelief turns to 
dismay whc.:n announcements are made that bases and 1.nstallations 
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arl t b closed 1n the United States and pt rsonF put out of Kork all 
~n 1~ 1nter ·s of economy . Econom~ 1s a • table qoal but ~t should 
apply lo xp •nd1 tun-s abroad as \·-ell as ex}wndJ lures at home. The 
1mpo mlmont by this Administration of $12 b1ll~on for domestic 
prorpum~;; the devaluation and other weakcnings of the dollar over 
tlw pd:,t two yent·s approach 50%; all marshall al:.tention to this 
pol i<·y or !;hamc•ftll overseas waste . IL cnnnot br~ I olcrated any longer. 
'I'Itr' «mcndm~--nt now pending is directed wot·Idwiclc and not 
spPclrically at Europe . The public debate over Lhc years has 
foc-u ·~· ~ prinmrl ly on Europe because l.l is there that the largest 
cont lllJPnt o( u.s . Porces is stationed. nut equally forceful 
qtlc··t ion; c<u'l be raised to the U.S. troops lc\ tioncd l.n Thal.land--
nmv ahouL 4'i , OOO; or in Okinawa--no....: ahouL 40,000; or Korea--also 
rtbOUl l(),orH); 01 'J'aiwan--about 8 , 000; or llw Philippines--about 
lS,OOll; or c•vt.,ll Bermuda where about 1,000 m•n de>fend our national 
111 r.:1cL , this amendment could I><· l\ll1y carried out during 
till rj1~a lwo yl~ar.s of its operation by reductions entirely from 
th8 arC'dS I hc.lVC mentioned, Thailand, Korea, Okinawa, 'l'ai\van , 
phj l1pru ne~ .:tncl Bcnnuda, \•;i thout rcmov1ng one soldier from the 
Europ~an Theatre. 
But since Europe has become the symbol and for the opponents of 
any t100p reduction, their strongest casC' , 1.t should be useful to 
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cxan 1.n the pre>mises and v~ew the weaknesses of tlus--the strongest 
case . Let us look at the ren.litl.es that fnc0d this Nation in 1951 
wh1 ch precipll ate'" the stat 1oni ng or four ll.v..L.sl.ons ~n Europe . Let 
us look at the premises upon whicl1 the ConJlCSS assented and the 
rcprcscntatJ.ons th~t were made about the permanence of such a 
commi tmcn t o 1 m.mpower abrcad . •rhen let us loo}: at Europe and the 
u.s. today, lA years after the War, 23 yeats aft0r the initial 
stall.onin<J of t hcse divis1.ons to NATO . 
EUROPE AFTER WORI,O WAR II 
\·lorld ~·lnr II left Western guropc in nun.; . The United States 
mov<'d swt ft.ly w tth ~..he most mass1.ve r.econstruct..L.on effort ever 
ttttt•mpLcd w1.th ..L.ts ~1arshall Plan--an effort that has proven 
su<"'ccssful beyond expectations . Thu institutions of Europe, 
polHl.cnl, l'COtlomic as well as military, \.;ere in shambles . \'lith 
l hc.:;c w0nkcned c:ond i tions in g\u:opc combinud \•.l th the common 
put·cl~pt ton ot t.hc thn')at of the horclcs tl"Om l.hc Eust a strong 
nn 11 L<l ry prcsunc~e in Western Europe to comp lcmcn t the economic 
effort was rc1t:.ional. 13ut the North Atlantic 'l'rcaty, ratified 1n 
1949, lid not commit U. S . troops to the European cont1nent . In fact, 
the Trenty itself made no commitment of u.s. ground tlOops to Europe . 
It ~as not until 1951 that the decision was made ~o send four land 
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! v1 on to Europe and Congressional assent solJ.Clted to 
tlus SLCJnJficant commitment of troops. 
The lu.story of: proceedings before the Congress are very 
revea 11 nt). 
Secretary Marshall claimed at that t1mc that there was nothing 
macpcnl ahout (our divisions . The level was selected based upon a 
judgment of our resources and their nvailalnlity. If only the 
same sL<mc1arct wnr.e to be applied today . And why should it not be 
applied? 
Bnt even more revealing is the exchange thnt Senator Hicken-
loeper h<:td wit.h S('cretary Acheson when it was nmde clear that each 
!;iqnatory to the NATO Treaty would unilaterally make its own 
cletermlnat.Lon of its contribution of milJ.tary equipment, manpower 
ancl facil1t:1es . ln addition, Secretary Achc""on envJ.sioned the 
return of troops subsequently sent if: l.he situation got. better. 
nut what: conditions were envisioned in 19Sl that initia l ly 
wan·autcd the troops to go to Euruopc and what thorny questions 
should be resolved for us to expect their retln n? Senator Smith 
of Ne, ... Jersey sou~ht this information from Ge neral Bradley in 1951 
and General Bradley felt the makJ.ng of a peace treaty w1th Germany 
and the state of preparedness of the other ndLions of Europe as well 
as Lhe aggressive intent~ons of the East were the chief J.rritants 
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that JUStifled u.s. action. Ho~ interest1ng that all of these 
1rr1tants have been significantly removed! 
N1netcen C1fty- one was, in add1tion, n time when the Korean 
War .... as underway; China was an active enemy; the Soviets had come of 
nuclear ngo; the Southeast European flank was still threatened; 
the Pconomtcs of Western Europe were jnst back on their feet; 
political Jnstnbility was prevalent in most West European countries . 
StroncJ men replilced strong institutions and prov1ded the cohesion for 
Western Europe. But even then the questions were raised: Should the 
u.s. commlt f:our divisions to Europe as a deterrent to another 
Etropcan war at least until Europe is rendy to assume its own 
dcfcn f"!s? 
The Congress assented to that request and the American troops 
tPturrwcl to Europe to meet the threat that wns perce1.ved at that 
t 1mc. However real the threat then , hos it chanC)ed since that time? 
EUROPE SINCE 'rilE 'so • s 
When u.s . troops were initially commjttcd to the European 
contlncnt, total GNP of all European NATO countries was $46 . 9 
billion compared to $831.9 bill1on for 1972 . The total exports 
from all NATO countries to the USSR and Eastern Europe in 1972 
amounted to $9.09 bill1on . The imports from the USSR and Eastern 
Europe to NATO countries totaled $8 . 67 billion . In this one area 
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alon of trade between the blocs, the most dramat1c change 1n 
cl1matc must be recogn1zed. 
nut even more s1gnificant than cvaluat1ng not only the 
strength of WcstC'!rn Europe and apprecint1.ng the strong trade flow 
between f:,st and West is the great numher of events since 1963 
that manifest. ns well as sign ificantLy cont t"ibute to the lessening 
of tensions between East and West. I have selected eighty-two 
events 1 consirlcr significant since 1963 (Sec appendix A). They 
rang~ tram th~ hot line to the Nuclear Test nnn to the Consular 
Convention to the Non-proliferation Treaty to the treaty normalizing 
relclt .tons bet ween Germany and Po land; to the Soviet-West German 
agreement on consulates: to the Ge~man treat1cs with Soviet Union; 
t:o th<~ SALT treaty: to the sign1ng o£ the trenty on relations 
between I~nst and West Germany. But to many the threat of an all-
ont convnntionnl war with the hordes ft·om the Eust remains the same. 
R1qld11y affects noL only the rhetoric buL tlw policy. General 
Eiscnho~.-;c•r testifying in 1951 about Con<p:cssional responsibility 
in the cletermJnatJon and the evolution of the level of u.s. troops 
in Europe said, 
I do think that Congress ought to see a respectable, 
reasonable approach, and the second they see anything to 
be, let's say, cockeyed and crazy, to qc>t 1nto the thing 
WJth hoth feet. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 78, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
-9-
Well, Mr. President, I think the time has come ~hen Congr ess 
must rrco)nize that in the ~ords of General eisenhower , somethi ng 
is "cockeyed" about U.S. troops stntionod ab1·oad. President 
Eisenhower later recognized thllt chunge was Justified. Ue stated 
in 1963 that one U.S. division woulct be suff1cient to fulfill our 
comm1t men t l o Nl\TO . 
It is evident from these indicia of engagement with the Soviet 
Un1on nnd Eastern Europe that the tension that existed in the early 
·sn•s has changed s1.gnificantly . 
Tt is t1me that the IJ.S . recognized the ex:tstence of its own 
policy Loward Lhc East . The policy of this rJoverrunent should be 
consistent , not one of engagement with the Soviet Union in trade 
a1cl cultural exchnnge and confrontaLJ.on in m1lltary matters . There 
should be but one barometer by which this government guides its 
actions toward the East . 
But we have many barometers that provide such different readings 
f:ot- thu .sDme phenomenon . Th1s dual standard f:or rationalizing 
Olll policies vis-a- vis the Eas~ern bloc cannot withstand thoughtful 
focus . If our policy toward the East is predicated upon a desire 
to open markets and develop a mutual interdependency of East and 
West upon each other, that policy will yield benefits beyond the 
economl.C' sphere as they have with increased cultural and educa tional 
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cxc;.-ll<lnCJes. It is n natural evolutiOn of the events of the past 
dec.td£~ . Dnt ~n Lhe m1litary sphere- -in Lhe NA'rO structure--what 
remains js a stale rigidity; a resort to old rationalizations from 
bygone years . 
THE MBFR 
Again and again over the years we have been told both by our 
own officials and those in Europe that some decrease in u.s . 
military presence should take place . 
But the time is never right for such action . Two years ago 
the argument was the policy of detente was nnderway and that nothing 
should be dono that would disrupt the process, including the 
U. S . -USSR SALT negotiations and the goals envisioned by Chancellor 
Brandt's "Ostpolitik." 
Today we find ourselves in a new situation . Success has been 
achieved in the first and most important round of SALT talks; the 
warsaw and Moscow treaties h a ve been concluded; the status of 
Berlin has been regularized ; through the exchanges of visits between 
Pres irlrmt N.ixon and Chainnan Brezhnew a new and better climate 
has been createrl which allows us to talk about the Cold War in terms 
of the past . 
Despite this movement , we are being told that this is the 
"worst possible time " in which to take any action on the question 
of our forces in Europe . The bargaining chip is back . Negotiations 
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on m1tuJl force reductions are to begLn on October 30th of this 
year. 
At the outset we 'Nere told by all the experts that MBFR nego-
tla 1on Wlll be even more compl~cated and lengthy than the first 
pha&c of SALT. Host informed and optimist~c speculations are that 
the OLlt:comu of sul'h negotiations after perhnpn two to three years 
rn~qh be d 1:eduction of no more:: than l0-15% on the part of those 
conn L c i ~·~: i nvo lvcd. 
r ndced, s~nce the pre lim ina ry talks--.i. c . , talks as to whether 
th<'r·e should be talks--\verc expected to take roughly five weeks 
and t.ook «hout five months, my skcptic~sm has been increased rather 
than dJminl!;hed about MBFR . I really doubt that the United States 
can n"'!mal.n immobilized on Lhe troops quest1.on for a minimum of two 
and possibly even four to fiv& years. So lhe argument to wait for 
MUFR r0ally is a postponement of significant action indefinitely. 
UNII.ATEMI, AC'r ION 
'l'hr. crucstions of MBFR are immensely complicated even if they 
were unclcrl:.clk'-m in a bilateral framework . 'l'he positioning of 
fo1ces, the proportionate reduction of one side as opposed to 
tlw other because of different logistical requirements w~ll 
gcneraLe 19 eli ffcrcnt: solutions equa 1 to the number of participants 
at the conference . So the complexity of l-1Bl'R is magnified 19 times. 
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'l'h~ wisdom of Lhe North Atlantic Treaty which left the quast1on 
of specific troop conm1itments in t.he NATO command to be decided 
unilat:erally hy each country is abandonod 1.n HBFR. Unilateral 
act1on on such a matter is the only practical method. Any nation 
enterinCJ into negotiations whether bilateral or multilateral only 
agrees :in those negotiations to what she deLennines unilaterally 
she c«n do or must do in her own national interest . No negotiation 
\oJi th thn Soviet Union would cause the Soviet. Union to reduce any 
of its troops from Eastern Europe if the Soviet Union determines 
that· t hose troops are nE=•eded in the Eastern European countries for 
othc r Lhtl.n protection against an external threat . In like manner, 
if Lhn Soviet Union senses a greater need for its troops on other 
frontiers , or if she desires to divert a greater proportion of her 
resourc(~s to non-military interests, then the appropr~ate reductions 
by t.hc USSR will be made--but only then . 
So unilateral action on our part to reouce U.s. troops in 
Europe, while still maintaining our commitment with a more wisely 
structured but significantly reduced level of troops could very 
well stimulate a similar independently arrived at response on the 
part of the soviet Union . This is not unprecedented in recent 
history . UnilaLeral and indepenoent actions taken by the United 
Stales and the soviet Union for moratoriums on nuclear tests in the 
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~tno phetL• pn•c1pital"d similar const.ruct~vc independent r e sponse s 
on edch sjde wl11ch ultimntely led to the nuclea r test ban tre a t y . 
S the arq uncnt.s that untlateral action canriot lend to construc tive 
r•sp . e rf' un.,.;arranted . 
Un~Jate1·aJ nctlon on the part of the Utnted States mig h t pro-
duce sur.pn.sinq and constrllctive results . Whut people fail t o 
realize 1s thaL the Soviet Union , ever s1nce World War II, h a s n o t 
onl). been actl.ng, but rcact1ng , vathin 1ts mil1tary estab l ishme n t . 
r-1ur.h of the Soviet force was createc'l at a t1mc \vhen the United S t ate, 
had c:1t:><lr llUClear superioriLy . Most irlLormcd observers , he r e and 
1n Wc•s t c rn Europe , ag rec that the Soviet Un ton is considerab l y more 
con. cq·vatl vc nn<l suspic1ous than the United Sta tcs because of its 
hlstortrnl experiences and the character of its sociely . 
V0 L no ont• seems willing to make allowances for the inertia 
01 this military conservatism in Lhe USSR. Wa forget that the 
SlJl cclll•s by our NATO Conunanders , as well as our political l eaders , 
regar 1ing n<?ed for NATO strcn~th and readiness are read i n qu i te 
a di [fcrent liqht by the soviet leadership Lhan vJC intend . I t seems 
a sjmpl0 propo:.1tion , llwl thPy trnst us no more than we t r ust 
them, hut \·;c do not seem t.o be able to absorb t h is view a nd 
d • upon it . 
nut even mor e signifl.cant l.S the Europe«n reactio n to any 
1 (•mova 1 ot u.s. troops from the continent . 1 t is an accepted 
• ~ ! ,.. ... . ... t 
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etxJom that the Europeans would follow suit and reduce their 
conv('IH:ionnl forces as well. 
\vhat ~<> tho threat, then, that requires so many u.s. forces 
on he Continent.? If thure 1s a t.ruly percelvcd threat of a con-
vcnt~onal war from the East, would not our European allies who 
arc ·loser to the "threat:" then respond by an accelerated commitment 
of resources? nut no, they would relax as well, accept the detente 
and devote more resources to non-military ventures . Then why 
should we, 3,000 miles away, asstUne such arrogance as to percel.ve 
a greater threat to Europe than do the Europeans? 
I th.ink the quesbon presumes a rat1.onal answer but there is 
none. It ctocs highlight, however, the dominance of the military 
pos l.urc in Europe by the United Sta tcs. Sl.ncc the formation of 
NJ\TO, there has never been a Supreme Allied Commander who was nol 
an American. u.s. perceptions of the threat are tolerated by the 
Europcnns and why not--che u.s. 1.s footing the greatest share of 
the cosL. Since it is really our nuclear response that the 
Europeans wish committect, their tolerance for our eccentricities--
includin<J Lhe World war II conventional war contingcncy--l.s very 
hi~Jh. 
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It ., ift:lPs me why a properly structure l u.s. mil1tary force 
of lP r ~t the most Lwo lean, mO)lle d1vt tons, in position to 
mov r • 1. Hy along the German frontier, wou 1 not be even greater 
.1. 1su rnn d unst: any form of. pressure from he East . 
I \lOUld be more realistl.c t.o the type o:L l.rnprobable attack 
that m ;ht conce1vabJy come from the East. It would perm.Lt American 
force's t<J be (.!n~Ftqcd f:rom the b·c;pnning, thus nllay:~ng any fears on 
U1E"! part of the Europeans tlB t the Urntcd Stat. •s would not be 
involv~l in the ~vent of a quick thrust into W stern Europe. 
THE FINANCIAL BUIIDhN 
Mr. Pre tdent, I have not dwelled upon the question of budgetary 
train an balance-of-payments costs of our troops stat1oneJ over-
c; ·a~. hclVC del1beratcly left th1s point to one side in cons idering 
lltCSL qt st.1.ons bec1usc I believe the United States -...111 bear the 
ncces dry costs t.o fulfill its international obligations . Our 
ltistory w1ll show that! But I bcl1.eve it iB clear that the United 
Statl"' c·an fulfill 1ls international obligations abroad w1th a 
s1gn1f1c nt rc~uct1on of U.S. forces on forei Jn soil. 
I hclicve a focus on this issue can be qained at last because 
of tlw compet.l.tlon for resources at: home. But these resources 
will ~ved, not by trimming our sails on our 1nternational 
obll.qi1ttons but by trinuning the waste from yt.:ars of innttention 
to a ra 1onal in crnat1onal poltcy. 
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Tlto SC'natc 1,, well <tware that the overall costs of our 
l"'Cinmttmcnt to Nl\'1'0 amounts to someth1ng 1.n the neighborhood of 
$17 }l!..,ll10....!!., in<'ludinq everything except stratcglc forces: that 
the dl.H cL anmml operating costs for the approximately 300,000 U.S. 
forces <~ctunlly located in Europe amounts to approximately $4 
billion, ancl with equipment , over $7 billion; that the net balance 
of payments drain because of the U.S . forces 1n Europe is approxi-
mately $1.5 billion annually; and that these figures are growing 
c1ai ly because of t1-e United States • disadvantage because of 
inflation, succnssive devaluations of the dollar and other 
wcakenings . 
A retut'n to rationality on the part of the United States and 
its forces abroad would yield a very significant savings in 
resources to the United States. I have deliberately not addressed 
myself to the issue of whether the troops that should be removed 
from forc1gn soil should be demobilized. I t is my opinion that a 
very sound international policy for t.he United States could be 
implemented with a reduction of 50% of the approximately 500 , 000 
Lroops stationed on foreign soil. 
The return of approximately 250 , 000 military personnel would 
reflect the judgment that they were not needed to fulfill existing 
international and domest i c ob l igations and therefore appropriate 
for demobilization . But I don ' t think that the question of 
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d~mob1l1zat1on has to be directly addressed at this time since I 
h 11 vc the pre sures of obta1nJnq a tntll.tary armed force without 
Lhc drnft will toil qrcat.: extent resolve Lhe l.ssue of demobilization. 
CONCLUSION 
r-1r. Pres 1.dent, the time has come to set aside the rhetoric 
of the cold W<u used to justify a status guo of military involvement 
<1 ronnct the' wo r 1 d. 
The l:.irllc lms come to rocogn1zc action that is long overdue, 
and to prevent deferral of that action under a cloak of multinatl.onal 
nCJO 1ations that could take a decade or longer to reconunend less 
Lhnn .... hat is ju5t:l. fied today. 
1 t; is t.ime now to respond to the sp1ri t of detente, to the 
stlcccss of tlHC\ Marshall Plan and the current economic vitality of 
Lurope, to respond to the realities of the '70's, to respond more 
fully to the 1\(w<ls of our own people at horne. 
I u 1·ge the adoption of the amendment. . 
. . 
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E\'F.NTS FROM 1963 TO 1973 WHICH SIGNIFICANTLY CONTRlBtrrED 
TO THE LESSENING OF TENSIONS BETh'F.EN EAST AND \lEST 
Rcncwnl of Franco-Soviet trade agrccoent. February 1973 • . 
:, U.S.-U.S.s.R. agreement to establish an emergency conu:runications 
link (hot line). June 1963. 
,=' 'l'rJp.lrt1te treaty banning nuclear weapons teats in the atmosphere, 
ln outrr space, and under water. October 1963 . 
.1./ Approvnl hy President Kennedy of U.S. wheat snl~s to the 
U.S . S.R. October 1963. 
~ U.S.-U.S . S.R. agreement of exchanges in the scientific, technical, 
educational, cultural, and other fields. February 1964. ( ~) 
1 u.S. rcRtorcs HFN treatment to Yugoslavia ancl Polnnd. March 1964. 
'I Renawnl of U.S.-U . S.S.R. trade agreement. April 1964. 
~ U.S. Romanian trade discussions. May 1964· 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. com;ular agreement. Sigucd .June 1964 . Ratified Harch 1967. 
I ( french-Soviet t r.1dc agreement . September 19M•. 
U.S.-U . S.S.R. agreement on cooperation in denn1inntlon of sea water. 
November 1964 • 
• · ' Hul'f1,1\~ Pact Pol1 tical Consultative Committee npproval of the 
Rapacki suggestion for a conference on European security . 
. January 1965. 
Franco-Soviet color television agreement. March 1965. 
Italo-Soviet agreement on joint cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic 
cnerr,y. October 1965. 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. consular convention. December 1965. 
ltnlo-Sovlet cultural agreement. February 1966. 
' ltalo-Soviet economic , scientific, and technical cooperation agreement. 
Apr:ll 1966 . 
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; { Yus•oslnvin b~comes full C(1ntract1nr, p trty to GATT. April 1966. 
, Dt• r.nulli"'A visit: to the U. S.S.R. June 1966. 
Frunco-Sovlet scientific, technical , and economic agreement . June 1966. 
rrunco-Sovlct spocc research agreement . June 1966 . 
.:: Fl.tt-Sovlct agreement for construction of a Flat factory in Russia . 
August 1966. 
Rcn~ult dnd Peugeot agreements with the U.S.S . R. regarding cooperation 
with Soviet motor industry. October 1966. 
~~ Ko~ygin's visit to France. December 1966. 
~ /Franco-Soviet consular agreement . December 1966. 
Establisl~ent of joint Franco-Soviet permanent commission . December 1966. 
J:stablishml!nt of Joint Franco-Soviet chamber of commerce . December 1966 
North Atlnntic Ministerial Council declaration emphasizing a willingness 
to explore ways of developing coopetatlun with the U. S . S. R. and 
the states of Eastern Europe. December 1966. 
Franco-Soviet atomic energy cooperation agreement. January 1967. 
Franco-Soviet trade agreement . January 1967. 
KcJHygin visit to the United Kingdom. February 1967. 
P.mf:lni visit to Moscow. May 1967. 
lt~lo-Sovict ~r,reement on cooperation in tourism. May 1967. 
Italo-Soviet consular convention. 'tolay 1967. 
Poland becomes full contracting member of GATT. June 1967 . 
U.K.-U.S.S.R. establish London-Moscow teleprinter line. August 1967. 
~ llarmel Report of North Atlantic Council proposes discussion of mutual 
and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. December 1967. 
'
1 
Announcl•mcnt of plans for joint Franco-Soviet space research. January 1968. 
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. Prir.e Hinistcr Hilson's visit to the U.S.S.R. January 1968 . 
U.K.-U . S.S . R. ::.cientific and technoloP,ical ngret•mcnt. January 1968. 
H1\TO cler:l.tr.tt ion calling for discussions of mutual .md balanced force 
reductions . June 1968 . 
Signature of the non- proliferation treaty on nuclear weapons. July 1968 . 
Natural gas delivery contract consummated between the State of Bavaria 
and lhc U. S. S. R. SeptembeT 1968 . 
U. K.-U.S . S.R. civil air agreement. December 1969. 
Fr:mC'o-Sovtct civil air agreement . Dc>cember 1969 . 
Ita lo- Sovit'l Long- term agreement on the supply of Soviet natural 
gas to Ttaly . December 1969 . 
Soviet-West German agreement s on supply of Soviet natural gas to 
\-lest Germany . February 1970 . 
Opening in Vienna of U. S.-U. S. S.R. negotiations on strategic arms 
limitation (SALT) . April 1970 . 
Nt\TO decl:tration on mutual and balanced force reductions . May 1970. 
Signing of non-aggression trea t y between t:he Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Sovi et Union . August 1970 . 
President Pompidou ' s visit to the U.S.S.R. October 1970 . 
Signing of Franco- Soviet protocol on Franco-Soviet political 
cooperation. October 1970. 
Signing of treaty of normalization of relations between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Poland . December 1970 . 
r.rention of a new basis for SALT negotiations. ~by 1971. 
Ou~ter of hard-line East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht. Hay 1971. 
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Ht•r.umpt:lon of SALT negotiations. July 1971. 
Sov f et-t<le::~l Germ:m agreemcn t I o open consul.\ tea in Hamburg and Leningrad • 
• July 1971. 
S lgn.tt.:ur<' of f 1rst part of quadripartite agreement on Derl1.n . September 1971. 
"" Chnnccllor Br.~ndt's visit to the U. S.S.R. September 1971. 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. ngreement on exchanging information on 
certain mlssile testing activities. September 1971 . 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on improving the "hot line" between Washington 
and Mo~cow. September 1971. 
' : SPcrctary Bre,hnev's visit to France. October 1971. 
( I 
t ) 
Frnnco-Sov1ct ngreement on economic , technical and industrial cooperation. 
October 1971. 
Romanin becomes a full contracting party to C~TT . November 1971. 
Soviet-\-lest Germnn civil air agreement. November 1971. 
lt:ltification by the West German parliament o( the \~est German treaties 
with the Soviet Union and Poland. 1-tay 1972. 
President Nixon's visit to Moscow. Nay 1972. 
U.S .-U . S.S.R. ~greement on cooperation in the exploration of outer 
space . t-tay 1972 . 
U.S .-U.S.S . R. 1greement on cooperation in solving problems of 
the environment. May 1972 . 
U. S. -U.S.S.R. agreement on joint efforts in the field of medical science 
and public health. May 1972. 
U.S.-U.S.S . R. agreement on expanded cooperation in science and technology 
and the establishment of a joint commission for this purpose . May 1972. 
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U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on cooperation hetween the American and Soviet 
navies r.o reduce the chance~ of dangerous incidents. May 1972. 
Signing of the SALT Treaty. May 1972. 
Sfr,ning of the final quadripartite agreement on Berlin . June 1972. 
U.S . -U.S.S.R . three-year agreement on the export of 
U.S . agricultural commodities (especially wheat and feed grains). 
July 1972. 
Suttlement of U.S . S.R. lend-lease obligationq, October 1972. 
U. S.-U.S.S.R . maritime agreement. Octoher 1972. 
Signing of U. S. -U.S.S.R. commercial treaty. October 1972. 
Qu;tdripart lte declaration supporting F.ast \lnd l-lest German membership 
in lhc United Nations. Novembor 1972. 
S lgning or the basic treaty on rei at ions hct\-leen the Federal Republic 
of C:l•nnany ond the Ger.man Democratic. Republic. December 1972. 
Opl"!ning of preparatory talks in Vienna for negotiations on mutual 
and balanced force reductions . January 1973. 
Sov Lat-l~e>:-;L German 10-year agreement on the dev<'lopment of economic, 
indu~trial, and technical cooperation, and cultural and 
educational exchanges. Hay 1973. 
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IN TilE SENATE OF TilE U!\ITED STATES 
net erred to U1o Commit.t('Q on ------------- and ordered to be printed. 
Ordered to lio on tho t.nblu nnd l.o bo print.od . 
AIV~EI~TlD l VJEI\J1C 
~~~SFir:LD Intended to be proposed by :\h·. __ _:..::.:.:;..;;~=~-------·----·-···-··· 
t i&Mn U'-'• -.f~U bot:ow) 
to£ X.X.X.X.X.Xx.x.xxxx.J<;xtbill 
n.n._2~~61i __ ,anAct to nu:.hori7.c appropriations cturing 
the fi£cal year 19"i 1 for procurcr.cnt or aircraft., mi"'f"ilcs, naval 
vc~scls, tracked co~oat vehicles, tory>cf.ocs , and other weapons, 
t~nd :· .. scorch, dt>velopmen• . t(>st anf. nvalua tion for the Armed Forces 1 
vi1-'P0lYliii{!((XXXXifMXvx;qns~. ,"'t:r~'(iollb'i\'ii\f.~ ond t.o prescribe the author-
ized pcr!;onne\ ~n.ren~t.h fm· cacn nc~;1ve duty co:r.poncnt and of the 
Selected Reserve o:' each reserve co:r.poncnt of the Armed Forces, 
and the military treining student loads, and for other purposes , 
viz: At the appropriat-e place in the bill incert a new section 
as follo.,.rs: 
Sec . (a) The Secretary of Defcnoe shall take such 
action as may be necessary to reduce, by not less than 50 per 
centum, the number of military forces of the United States assigned 
to duty in foreign countries on March 1, 1973 . Such reduction 
chall be completed not la te r than June 30, 1976; and not less than 
one-fourth of the t.otal ~·eduction required to be made shall com-
pleted prior to July 1, 1974, and not less than one-half of such 
t.ott•l reduction shall be completed prior ·o July 1 , 1975. 
(b) ::otwiths:.andin& ar.y ot.hcr provision of law, no funds may 
be expended on or after July 1 , 1971~, to support. or maintain mil i-
tary forces of the United States assigned to duty in foreign 
countries if the nu~ber o~ such forces so assigned to such duty 
on or after cuch dat.e exceeds a number equal to the number of 
such forces oasir,ned to such duty on Mnrch 1, 1973, reduced by 
such number as n~cessary to co:r.ply \otith the provisions of sub-
ocction (a) of this section . 
Amdt. No. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 78, Folder 3, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
liNaT~I•'•rAll., Sa tii\Tr. 
OfiiU. Of ltllll I!KAJitL CCili~SU. - 2-
(c) As used in this section, the •erm 11~ilitary fo r ces of' 
the Unit.ed S+-ates'' shall not include personnel ass!gned l;O 
duty aboard naval vessels of the Unil;cd States . 
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